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Abstract We measure inequality of opportunity for earnings acquisition in the
U.S. between 1968 and 2001. Following recent theories of social justice, earnings
determinants are divided into two parts: Circumstances, which are characteristics
outside individual control and effort representing factors impacting earnings but
under individuals’ responsibility. Equality of opportunity requires that inequality of
circumstances must be corrected while differences of effort must remain unaltered.
Circumstances are represented by parental education and occupation, ethnic origin,
place of birth and age. Effort is modeled with schooling choices and labour supply
decisions. Using the PSID from 1968 to 2001, we provide two alternative assessments
of inequality of opportunity using counterfactual distributions. The statistical frame-
work is semi-parametric and builds on duration models. Finally, we conclude that
inequality of opportunity represents between 20 and 43% of earnings inequality, but
decreases all over the period reaching around 18% in 2001.
Keywords Equality of opportunity · Inequality · Income distribution ·
Semi-parametric estimator
JEL Classification D31 · D63
1 Introduction
Over the last 30 years, the U.S. has displayed a higher level of earnings inequality
than most other western developed countries [28]. International comparisons of
earnings inequality have mainly paid attention to changes in labour demand and
supply, and to institutions ruling the labour market [20]. More recent studies [1] have
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pointed out political and social institutional mechanisms. According to these authors,
other noneconomic factors such as the political system, the size of the country and its
history would account for part of the larger American earnings inequality.
An alternative view considers that across the two sides of the Atlantic the social
perception of justice relies on different ethical values. Following that view, popular
belief that effort and willingness are essential parts in the determination of social
positions in the U.S. would conflict with a European conception for which inheritance
of the past and luck play a larger role in shaping individual outcomes.1 Hence, the
American Society would not consider that a large income redistribution would be
necessary, while in Europe a different perception of the causes of inequality would
advocate such policies.
With regard to these differences, correction of total inequality might not be the
best definition of the goal of social justice in the U.S. A conception of justice
introducing individual responsibility might be better at reflecting why redistribu-
tive policies are less developed in the U.S. compared to continental Europe. The
distinction of factors generating interindividual income differences between on the
one hand those resulting from individual responsibility, commonly called effort, and
on the other hand those exogenous to individual choices, called circumstances, has
been strongly supported over the last 20 years by philosophers on responsibility such
as Dworkin [17], Arneson [3] or Roemer [34]. These authors have advocated that
inequality that individuals can be held responsible for should not be corrected, while
it is morally fair to aim at correcting inequality resulting from factors exogenous to
individual choice.
In this paper we assess earnings inequality in the U.S. from 1968 to 2001 reflecting
these theories of justice. In order to represent effort, we use earnings variation
sources stemming from individual choices: human capital investment and labour
supply decisions. These factors impact individual earnings but may at the same time
be correlated with determinants exogenous to individual responsibility. To represent
circumstances we use individual social background, since most authors would admit
social background is an unfair source of inequality. We use the full Panel Study
of Income Dynamics from 1968 to 2001 providing individual earnings, education,
occupation, and labour supply behaviours over two generations. This description
of social background is still partial. It remains remarkably detailed compared with
what is available in other data sets. Given that information, we conclude that social
background impacts schooling choices but relatively less labour supply decisions.
Finally, over the period inequality of opportunity represents between 20% and 43%
of earnings inequality depending on the inequality index chosen and has decreased
reaching around 18% of total earnings inequality in 2001.
Several empirical analyses of inequality of opportunity have already been pro-
posed. Dardanoni et al. [13], or Betts and Roemer [6] have focused on the U.S. in
the nineties looking at the best policy to equalize opportunities for income across
ethnic groups. Another interesting contribution provided by Bourguignon et al. [8]
turns to the Brazilian case and decomposes the share of total observable inequality
1Alesina and La Ferrara [2] present a study on individual preferences for redistribution in the U.S.
Alesina and Glaeser [1] review deeply the idea that Americans believe social mobility is important
in their country, and that poor people have large opportunities for climbing the social ladder. While,
Europeans perceive a lower social mobility in their country.
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due to inequality of opportunity. Moreover they develop a longitudinal perspective
looking at the changes in Equality of Opportunity across cohorts. Finally, Checchi
and Peragine [12] turn to the Italian case and propose a decomposition close to
Bourguignon et al. [8] but on Italian data and with inequality indexes. In regards to
these previous analyses, this article contributes in several respects to the literature.
Firstly, we implement a longitudinal analysis over 33 years in the US. As outcome
inequality has strongly increased over the period, it is interesting to know whether in-
equality of opportunity has surged or if the two inequality concepts provide different
pictures of the American society. Providing an assessment of the change over time of
inequality of opportunity is the first contribution of the paper. Secondly, this paper
implements recent econometric techniques to estimate and simulate counterfactual
earnings distributions due to Donald et al. [16]. The decomposition implemented
here is inspired from Bourguignon et al. [8] contribution’s but with an alternative
econometric strategy. This new empirical approach is the second contribution of the
paper. Thirdly, we develop a double perspective with two symmetric but different
approaches focusing on the one hand on inequality due to the circumstances and on
the other on inequalities due to effort. It provides some sensitivity analysis of the
results. This double approach is the third contribution of the paper.
The next section develops our methodology and the statistical framework.
Section 3 describes the PSID data. Results and their analysis are presented in
Sections 4 and 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Measuring equality of opportunity: two approaches
To measure equality of opportunity, the first theoretical contributions were Roemer
[33] and Van de Gaer [35]. Dividing the population in different sets of individuals
sharing the same circumstances Roemer proposed comparing the conditional income
distributions, while Van de Gaer axiomatized comparing the conditional means.
Their conditional approaches have been followed by several empirical analyses:
Lefranc et al. [26], Dardanoni et al. [13], or Betts and Roemer [6]. In this paper we
study the unconditional earnings distribution, as Bourguignon et al. [8] and Checchi
and Peragine [12]. Our framework can be presented as follows: Let xe be effort, and
xc circumstances. These are two univariate random variables. Earnings is a random
variable y. The observed earnings density can be written:
fy(y) =
∫
xe
∫
xc
f
(
y|xe, xc) h (xe, xc) dxedxc (1)
With h(·, ·) a bivariate distribution of effort and circumstances. As Roemer [34]
has argued convincingly, if individuals coming from more privileged circumstances
can exert higher effort level, then to measure inequality of opportunity it is more
relevant to assess relative effort differences. The density can then be written:
fy(y) =
∫
xe
∫
xc
f
(
y|xe, xc) he (xe|xc) g (xc) dxedxc (2)
With he(·|) a conditional effort distribution and g(·) a marginal circumstances
distribution. With this definition of effort, an individual exerts an higher (relative)
effort if he is ranked higher in his conditional distribution. Hence, individuals from
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different circumstances but at the same conditional quantile have exerted the same
effort. From Eq. 2 two different measures of inequality of opportunity can be
implemented. The next section presents the first, Section 2.2 presents the second.
2.1 The indirect approach: measuring inequality of effort
A first definition states that there is equality of opportunity if and only if only effort
differences generate earnings differences. Therefore, we can compare the observed
distribution with a hypothetical distribution in which earnings inequality stems only
from effort differences. To build that counterfactual distribution we simulate an
earnings density in which individuals benefit from an identical set of circumstances
but keep their observed conditional effort. To that purpose we proceed in two steps.
In the first step, we simulate effort for each individual from an identical set of
circumstances. In the second step, we simulate earnings conditional on the simulated
effort and with the same set of circumstances.
Firstly, starting from Eq. 2 we estimate the conditional effort distribution he(·|xc).
In our modeling, it is a nonlinear function of the parameters, so he(·|xc) = θ1(xcβc +
1), with xc a vector of circumstances variables, βc a vector of parameters to be
estimated, and 1 an unobserved residual. With βˆc estimated by ML,
2 the simulated
density in which any individual has the same fixed set of circumstances xc (eg: at the
mean values) can be simulated by:
h˜e
(·|xc) = θ1
(
xcβˆc + ˆ1
)
. (3)
After estimating this counterfactual effort distribution, we assign to each individ-
ual an effort level. In order to preserve the relative effort differences and remove the
effect of circumstances, individual effort is predicted at the same quantile as in the
observed distribution.3 From an econometric point of view, we predict individual
effort with the following formula: for observation i, x˜ei = H˜−1e (He(xei |xc)|xc), with
He(·) the observed effort CdF and H˜e(·) the simulated effort CdF. This rank
preserving transformation firstly proposed by Juhn et al. [23] is widely used in the
income distribution literature.
Secondly, we estimate an earnings distribution conditionally on circumstances and
effort. The observed density can be written: fy(y|xe, xc) = θ2(xcγc + xeγe + 2) and
the simulated one:
f˜y
(
y|x˜e, xc) = θ2 (xcγˆc + x˜eγˆe + ˆ2) . (4)
To simulate this distribution one has to replace the observed effort level xe in
the prediction with the one simulated x˜e in the step described above to remove
the effect of circumstances playing through effort. Then, from Eq. 4 we assign
individual earnings by preserving individual ranks and we predict earnings at the
same quantile as in the observed earnings distribution. Hence, individual earnings
free of any impact of circumstances are given by: y˜i = F˜−1y (Fy(·|xc, xe)|xc, x˜e). Lastly,
2The statistical framework is described in Section 2.3.
3For example, an individual at the 10th percentile of his observed conditional effort distribution will
still be at the 10th percentile in the simulated effort distribution Eq. 3.
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the unconditional distribution generating earnings inequality only due to effort is
given by:
f˜ (y) =
∫
x˜e
f˜y
(
y|x˜e, xc) h˜e (x˜e|xc) dx˜e. (5)
This distribution provides an indirect measure of inequality of opportunity since it
measures inequality of effort. A similar approach has been followed by Bourguignon
et al. [8]. In their terminology, the direct effect of circumstances on earnings has
been erased with the conditional earnings density f˜ (·|x˜e, xc), and the indirect effect
of circumstances playing through effort has been removed with the conditional effort
density h˜(·|xc). As Checchi and Peragine [12] point out, this approach comes back
to removing between-circumstance groups inequality to keep only within group
earnings differences. Hence with a decomposable inequality index, we can compute
inequality of opportunity as the difference between inequality in distribution Eq. 2
and in distribution of Eq. 5. In the empirical section, using indexes from the entropy
class we assess the degree of inequality of opportunity in the U.S. over the last
33 years due to these observable characteristics.
2.2 The direct approach: measuring inequality of circumstances
An alternative view considers that there is equality of opportunity if and only if
individuals coming from different circumstances but exerting the same relative effort
do benefit from the same earnings. To measure inequality of opportunity following
this definition we can compare the observed distribution with a counterfactual one
describing a hypothetical society in which individuals exert the same effort but
come from different circumstances. The methodology is symmetrical to the first
approach. In the first step, we simulate effort at the conditional mean but keep the
observed circumstances differences to remove within group inequality. In the second
step we simulate earnings conditional on the simulated effort and the observed set
of circumstances.
Firstly, to simulate the counterfactual effort distribution, we keep circumstances
differences but simulate individual effort at the conditional mean. The counterfactual
effort density is given by:
˜˜he
(·|xc) = θ1
(
xcβˆc + ˆ1
)
.
This distribution is identical to the observed one. Then, we predict individual
effort at the mean of their conditional distribution: ˜˜xe = xe|xc = ˜˜H−1e (He(xe|xc)|xc).
With such a procedure we erase within group inequality due to relative effort
differences and keep only between groups inequality due to circumstances.
Secondly, using the estimated conditional earnings density fy(y|xe, xc) =
θ2(xcγc + xeγe + 2), we can simulate an earnings distribution in which every indi-
vidual exerts the same effort but comes from different circumstances. To simulate
this earnings distribution we replace the observed effort level with the simulated one
from the first step and we keep the circumstances unchanged:
˜˜fy
(
y|xc, xe) = θ2 (xcγˆc + xeγˆe + ˆ2) . (6)
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From this simulated distribution, individual earnings are predicted at the mean of
the conditional distribution to erase within group earnings differences due to effort:
˜˜y = ˜˜F−1y (Fy(y|xc, xe)|xc, xe). The unconditional earnings distribution displaying only
inequality due to circumstances is provided by:
˜˜f (y) =
∫
xc
∫
xe
˜˜fy
(
y|xe, xc) ˜˜he (xe|xc) g (xc) dxedxc (7)
Inequality in Eq. 7 provides a direct measure of inequality of opportunity prevail-
ing in the observed distribution, since inequality of effort has been netted out. While
the direct and indirect approaches are symmetric they can provide different assess-
ments of inequality of opportunity; using both provides a test of their consistency.
The next section describes how the micro-simulation framework is implemented.
2.3 Statistical framework: semi-parametric-estimation of a distribution
in the presence of covariates
Measuring inequality of opportunity requires estimating Eqs. 5 and 7 and entails
evaluating effort and earnings distributions conditionally on observed covariates.
We implement a semi-parametric estimator for conditional distributions proposed
by Donald et al. [16]. It builds on the duration models literature. Let f (y|x) be the
density. The classical following relation holds:
f (y|x) = S(y|x) × h(y|x).
With h(y|x) the hazard rate and S(y|x) the survivor function. The approach relies
on a discrete time duration model. The distribution support is divided in J intervals:
[I0, I1[...[IJ−1, IJ[. Let I j represents interval [I j−1, I j[. Using a proportional hazard
rate model, it is possible to show (eg: Meyer [30]) that with a non-parametric baseline
hazard rate,4 the hazard rate can be written:
h
(
y ∈ I j|x
) = 1 − exp [−exp(xβ + γ j)] (8)
With γ j = log(
∫ I j
I j−1 h0(u)du) the integrated baseline hazard. In the previous case,
any explanatory variable will have the same effect all along the distribution, which
represents an obvious drawback. To overcome it, the support of the distribution is
divided in P segments, and xβ is replaced by: Pp=11(y ∈ Ip)xβ p, with 1(·) a dummy
variable. Hence, covariates are introduced as variables with time-varying coefficients
in a duration model. Estimation of the parameters β and γ is nowadays usual by
maximum likelihood. Derivation of the likelihood is provided in Meyer [30] an
alternative approach is proposed in Jenkins [22]. After estimation of β and γ an
estimation of the conditional density is provided by:
fˆ
(
y ∈ I j|x
) = Sˆ (y ∈ I j|x) − Sˆ (y ∈ I j−1|x) (9)
The next section describes the PSID data.
4ie: piece-wise constant on all J intervals.
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3 Data: the panel study of income dynamics
3.1 Data set
Data come from the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics. This data set is a
household panel which began in 1968 and is still running. The panel was originally
composed from around 5,000 households. Individuals have been followed annually
from 1968 to 1997, then 1 year out of two, hence 1999 and 2001. We have used
every wave from 1968 to 2001.5 Children of households have been followed when
they leave the family. This data base is a leading source for longitudinal studies on
the U.S. It is possible to observe families over two generations. Individuals provide
information on their monthly position on the labour market, their family situation,
and their social environment. They declare their annual earnings and the number of
hours worked during the previous year. In order to maximize sample sizes, we have
used additional data to complete annual questionnaires.6 While the data is a panel,
we will not use the panel structure of the data except for averaging earnings. The
longitudinal nature of the study comes from the repetition of the procedure on the
32 cross sections. Finally, we have information about 22,759 households and 119,996
annual observations from 1968 to 2001.
3.2 Main variables
3.2.1 Outcome variable: mean labour earnings
Annual earnings include transitory variations and measurement errors. To neutralize
these erratic components, earnings have been averaged up to 5 years.7 One may
argue, however, that removing transitory earnings variations may lead to smooth
the role of effort and then overestimate the relative importance of inequality of
opportunities. To assess the sensitivity of this hypothesis we have implemented
two alternative specifications without averaging annual earnings and with 3 years
averages. Results will be presented with these three specifications. Finally, earnings
data have been converted in 2000 dollars with the consumer price index.
3.2.2 Circumstances
Parental characteristics are associated with circumstance variables. They are on the
one hand exogenous to individual choice and on the other hand partially correlated
with their offspring’s earnings. Individual circumstances include age, the number of
years of education of both parents, the occupational group of the father (six groups)
and the individual ethnic group (one dummy variable for individuals of the black
5Data of year n cover year n–1. Hence the full period in 1967–2000.
6The following files have been used: Family history files, family income plus files, Hours of work and
Wages Files, Retrospective occupation-industry. See http://simba.isr.umich.edu/Zips/zipSupp.aspx.
7The mean earnings refers to the middle year. If individuals are observed on a shorter period of time,
their earnings is averaged on that subinterval. Examples: Mean earnings over 5 years in 1980 is the
mean earnings from 1978 to 1982. For individuals observed only in 1980, 1979 and 1981, their mean
earnings is computed over three rather than 5 years. If they are observed only in 1979 and 1981, then
they do not belong to the 1980 sample.
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minority) and region of birth (one dummy variable if born in a southern state). This
set of variables represents a description of social background which is still partial
but it is available and comparable over 33 years. Using the longitudinal structure
of the data it could have been possible to estimate the mean parental earnings in
the first waves and their offsprings in the last waves. With this approach the results
did not change much over the 1985–2001 period. However, samples would have been
much smaller leading to potential selection biases. Therefore, in this study we restrict
to parental information provided by the individual. However, it does not represent
all the factors affecting earnings and exogenous to individual responsibility. Future
works should try to take into account a thinner description of circumstances through
family patrimony or inheritance for example.
3.2.3 Effort
Determining fair sources of inequality is a difficult and a controversial issue, since
most earnings determinants are correlated with individual choice and at the same
time with circumstances. Any strategy to disentangle the two may not be universally
accepted. To that purpose, we follow the literature and effort is represented by
individual characteristics including at least some individual choice component. Then
to measure correctly effort we will keep only the share of the variance unaccounted
for once conditioning on circumstances. Concerning earnings, human capital accu-
mulation and labour supply behaviour are the major determinants of interindividual
earnings differences. They will be the two effort characteristics.
More precisely, individual schooling attainment can be considered as an effort
characteristics. It is at least partly the result of individual decisions. Admittedly,
individual circumstances still play a role in the determination of education level.
Hence, with binding credit constraints for education some individuals may not be
able to invest as much as they would like. On American data, Carneiro and Heckman
[11] and Cameron and Taber [10] reject this hypothesis. Admittedly, educational
choices depend also on ability and expected future labour outcomes and these
characteristics are partly inherited. It would be interesting to try to disentangle the
effect of circumstances on education going through ability from the direct effect on
schooling attainment. Unfortunately, the PSID does not provide ability scores to
implement this decomposition.
The second effort variable is annual working hours. Earnings level is directly
linked to the number of hours worked. From an ethical perspective, it seems fair that
individuals working more receive a higher return. Nevertheless, working time choices
result either from employment possibilities or public structure (transportation. . . )
partly linked to inherited determinants. Moreover, the number of hours may not
been chosen if individuals are constrained to work part time. As these effort variables
are at the same time partially correlated to individual circumstances, in the empirical
analysis we estimate education and working hours distributions conditionally on
individual circumstances.
3.3 Samples
Samples are restricted to working male heads of household from 30 to 50 years
old with positive annual earnings. Individuals are included whatever the number
of periods they are observed, since earnings are averaged accordingly. The age
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range aims at providing a reasonable assessment of their permanent position on
the labour market. For self-employed individuals we use their labour earnings as
declared in the PSID. Admittedly, the longitudinal structure of the study comes
from the repetition of the procedure on the 32 waves of the PSID, since the panel
structure of the data has not been used except for averaging earnings. Finally, the
analysis is restricted to men; for female labour supply a statistical modeling taking
into account nonparticipation would need to be introduced and it is not the case in
the present paper. In the panel, 65,427 individual-years respect these criteria. Table 9
in the Appendix presents sample sizes and inequality measures from 1968 to 2001.
Table 1 shows that the composition of the American male working population
has considerably changed over the period. With time, education levels have strongly
increased. Hence for example, 48% had not finished high-school in 1968, but only
15% in 2001. The share of the male working population with at least a high school
degree reaches around 60% in 2001 (36+23%), while it was only 33% (20+13%) in
1968. American males work on average 2300 hours annually all over the period.
Table 1 Descriptive statistics—selected years
1968 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2001
Earnings 42 461 47 520 46 119 45 011 43 737 47 179 49 585
(28447) (29678) (26 193) (31745) (33721) (40854) (45176)
Effort
Hours 2333 2262 2246 2226 2251 2245 2289
(623) (614) (615) (640) (598) (616) (582)
Education (%)
< Hg-school .488 .375 .248 .188 .216 .135 .151
Hg-sc. degree .174 .167 .185 .195 .212 .250 .250
College .207 .271 .337 .357 .343 .369 .361
Adv. college .129 .185 .228 .259 .227 .244 .237
Circumstances
Age 39.92 39.61 37.70 37.17 38.14 39.38 40.26
Black(%) .323 .307 .304 .289 .290 .330 .338
Education of the father (%)
< Hg-school .840 .764 .649 .578 .566 .484 .376
Hg-sc. degree .087 .137 .210 .252 .256 .299 .331
College .035 .044 .070 .083 .074 .093 .120
Adv. College .036 .053 .069 .086 .102 .122 .171
Education of the mother (%)
< Hg-school .764 .646 .540 .458 .475 .353 .262
Hg-sc. degree .177 .264 .326 .383 .367 .441 .467
College .036 .052 .079 .097 .084 .121 .151
Adv. College .021 .036 .052 .060 .072 .084 .117
Occupational group of the father (%)
Professional .044 .063 .079 .101 .110 .114 .143
Manager .076 .095 .093 .087 .086 .101 .112
Clerical .029 .039 .062 .062 .066 .073 .071
Craftsman .163 .191 .199 .215 .201 .268 .265
Operative .119 .157 .182 .188 .162 .191 .196
Farmer .565 .452 .381 .344 .371 .251 .210
Source: PSID, working men from 30 to 50. Hg-school: High school. College: between 13 and 16 years
of education. Adv. College: ≥ 16 years of education
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Individual circumstances appear in the bottom of the table. In 1968, 84% of men
had a father who had dropped of high-school, while they were less that half (37%)
in that situation in 2001. Mother’s education has strongly increased and parallels
father’s education. Changes in parental education are impressive. In 1970, 6% of
mothers and 7% of fathers have been to college while nearly one out of three have
been in 2001. The social position of the fathers has changed as well. These evolutions
strengthen the need to control for the evolution of the circumstances’ marginal
distributions. A conditional approach would not have permitted distinguishing the
changes in inequality of opportunity from the changes in the conditioning groups
themselves.
4 Changes in earnings inequality: 1968–2001
In this section we summarize earnings inequality (ie inequality of outcome) from
1968 to 2001. In the next section we will compare it with the change in inequality of
opportunity. In the U.S. the earnings distribution has considerably changed over the
1968–2001 period (Katz et al. [25], Levy and Murphy [28], Juhn et al. [23], Katz and
Autor [24]). These studies use the CPS to assess the evolution of earnings inequality.
This section develops a parallel study based on the PSID data.
Figure 1 represents these evolutions with the Theil index on PSID data with our
three earnings specifications. Table 9 in Appendix provides other indexes. The figure
.
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.
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Year
5 years Avg. 3 years Avg. 1 year Earnings
Fig. 1 Earnings inequality: Theil Index 1968–2001. Source: PSID, working men from 30 to 50
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Table 2 Lorenz dominance tests
5 years average earnings
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
1970 = < > > > >
1975 − ? > > > >
1980 − − > > > >
1985 − − − > > >
1990 − − − − ? >
1995 − − − − − =
Source: PSID, working men from 30 to 50. Lorenz dominance tests: >: The Lorenz curve in row
dominates the Lorenz curve in column. ? The Lorenz curves are non-comparable. = The Lorenz
curves are equal
reflects the large increase in earnings inequality. The three earnings specifications
display the same trend, while averaging decreases slightly the level by one or two
Theil points. From then on, we comment only the 5 years earnings specification.
On this figure three periods appear. Firstly, from the end of the sixties to the mid-
seventies the earnings dispersion has slightly changed. As already noted by Juhn et al.
[23] this period displays only minor changes in the earnings distribution, the Theil
index changing from .17 to .15. Secondly, from the mid-seventies to the beginning
of the eighties earnings inequality decreases slightly. Thirdly, from 1980 onwards
large changes in the distribution have taken place, and earnings inequality has surged
sharply until 2001. In the PSID data, the turning year is 1980, this is confirmed
by Juhn et al. [23], Eckstein and Nagypal [18] and Gottschalk [21] with the CPS
data. The Theil index growth rate from 1980 to 2001 is around 79% (from .13 in
1980 to .24 in 2001). However, during the second half of the nineties the growth of
earnings inequality is weaker before increasing over the last few years of the sample
as described by Lemieux [27], Autor et al. [5] and Gottschalk and Danziger [19].
Describing inequality through inequality indexes has two shortcomings. Firstly,
some of the evolutions might not be statistically significant. Secondly, other inequal-
ity indexes having different properties might provide different conclusions. In order
to answer the two weaknesses we implement Lorenz dominance tests. It is non-
parametric and based on Davidson and Duclos [14]. The methodology is presented
in more details in Lefranc et al. [26]. Lorenz dominance allows unanimity of a wide
range of relative inequality indexes.8 The results of the tests are presented in Table 2
by 5-year-intervals for the 5 years average specification.9 The tests reveal that the
end of the seventies is the period with the lowest earnings inequality. After 1980,
earnings inequality increases every year. Table 2 confirms the growth in earnings
inequality in the eighties, while the relative stability of the second part of the nineties
is reflected by the tests. On the whole, only two non-comparability show up out of 21
8See Atkinson [4].
9We do not test every year to keep results easy to read. Admittedly, the choice of selected years is
quite arbitrary, but as our earnings specification is a 5 years average the results should be close for
intermediate years.
N. Pistolesi
comparisons (9.5%). Using an ordinal approach turns out not to be too restrictive,
since most of the time the tests are able to rank the distributions. Finally, the tests
reflect broadly our previous observations with the Theil indexes.
5 Changes in equality of opportunity: 1968–2001
To measure inequality of opportunity we compare the observed earnings distribu-
tions with two simulated distributions: one in which effort has been equalized and
one in which circumstances are identical. In Section 5.1 we build these counterfactual
distributions from 1968 to 2001. In Section 5.2 we measure changes in inequality of
opportunity from these simulated distributions.
5.1 Building counterfactual distributions
To estimate counterfactual distributions, we estimate and simulate two conditional
effort distributions (schooling, and hours worked) and one conditional earnings
distribution. Then we build the counterfactual unconditional earnings distribution
as described in Eqs. 5 and 7.
5.1.1 Schooling distribution
Heterogeneity in education levels represents a first source explaining interindividual
earnings differences. Insofar as human capital investment decisions result at least
partly from individual choices, years of schooling is an effort characteristic. We esti-
mate and simulate conditional effort distributions using the methodology presented
in Section 2.3 on each wave of the PSID from 1968 to 2001. We use the number of
years of education as dependent variable, it ranges from 1 to 17, then the baseline
hazard rate is estimated with 17 dummy variables. Each explanatory variable has
been crossed with two dummies to obtain different effects on different parts of the
schooling distribution. The two explanatory segments run from 1 to 11 years and
from 12 to 17 years to isolate individuals with a high-school diploma from high-school
drop-outs. As the statistical framework comes from duration models, estimated
coefficients can be interpreted as the effect on the conditional exit probability. Thus,
for the schooling distribution a positive coefficient means an education level that is on
average a quicker exit from the distribution, ie a lower schooling level. Symmetrically,
a negative coefficient means a higher schooling level.
Table 3 presents results in 1968 and 2001.10 Coming from the black minority is
correlated with a lower schooling level since coefficients are positive. The effect
is larger at the bottom of the distribution than at the top. This result reflects
10The estimated baseline hazard rate is of low interest here, it has not been reproduced but the
dummies are significant at 1% taking increasing values.
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Table 3 Estimation of the conditional education distribution
Years of Ed. 1968 2001
1–11 12–17 1–11 12–17
Age −.040*** .001 −.028*** −.034***
(.007) (.009) (.010) (.006)
Black .692*** .439*** .451*** .045
(.086) (.167) (.133) (.084)
Born south .538*** −.031 −.220* .038
(.083) (.129) (.124) (.071)
Educ. Father −.110*** −.071*** −.111*** −.072***
(.019) (.021) (.024) (.015)
Educ. Mother −.147*** −.028 −.135*** −.093***
(.016) (.020) (.024) (.018)
Occupational group of the father (ref: Farmer)
Professional −.487 −.958*** −.379 −.943***
(.301) (.239) (.268) (.138)
Manager −1.464*** −.942*** −.319 −.743***
(.272) (.168) (.238) (.134)
Clerical −.410 −.495** −.734** −.641***
(.320) (.251) (.335) (.148)
Craftsman −.440*** .027 −.458*** −.207*
(.123) (.152) (.164) (.108)
Operative −.277** −.283 −.333** .102
(.126) (.178) (.158) (.113)
Maximum Likelihood estimation. Source: PSID, men from 30 to 50. 1551 observations in 1968, and
2246 observations in 2001. Educ. father (resp. mother): number of schooling years of the father (resp.
mother). Born south: Born in a southern state. Standard errors in brackets.
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
the large racial educational inequalities in the United States as described by Neal
[31]. While the age coefficient is negative meaning that older men have a higher
probability of having more schooling, they are not always significant and are ten
times less important than ethnicity (ratio of the parameters). Parental characteristics
have the expected sign: individuals coming from privileged backgrounds have more
education. Father’s education is significant all along the distribution and its effect is
remarkably close in 1968 and in 2001. While mother’s education appears important
at low education levels only. Lastly, the occupational group of the father is strongly
significant, as sons of farmers perform lower than the other origin social groups and
sons of managers and professionals reach higher schooling levels.
We predict two education distributions. In the first one (indirect approach) we
erase circumstances differences to keep only inequality due to effort. As previously
mentioned, we consider age, the color of the skin, education of both parents, the
region of birth and the occupation of the father as factors outside individuals’ respon-
sibility. Education of both parents is set at 13 years, his occupation at professional,
the region of birth as not being the south and the ethnic group as not belonging to the
black minority. In the second simulated distribution (direct approach) we predict the
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same (mean) education to individuals coming from the same circumstances to erase
effort differences but we let the circumstances at their observed levels.
Table 4 presents the observed and the two simulated schooling distributions. As
expected the simulations reduce the dispersion of educational attainment since the
standard error of the schooling distribution decreases from 3.52 in 1968 (2.49 in 2001)
to 2.05 (resp. 1.17 in 2001) when we erase circumstances differences and to 2.24 (resp.
1.31) years of education when removing effort differences. Equalizing circumstances
seems more important at the bottom of the distribution, since the lower 20% goes
from 8 to 11 years in 1968 and from 12 to 14 years in 2001, while equalizing effort
do not change the lower part of the distribution at 8 years in 1968 and 12 years
in 2001. Interestingly and symmetrically, differences of effort impact more the top
of the schooling distribution than differences of circumstances, since the top of the
distribution decreases more when equalizing effort (see Table 4), while the top of the
distribution remains unaltered when erasing circumstances differences.
5.1.2 Labour supply distribution
Labour supply is our second effort characteristic. The impact of the number of hours
worked must not be corrected on earnings differentials. Working hours distributions
are estimated conditionally on social background (education of the parents, and
occupation of the father), ethnic origin, age and region of birth as well as education.
The dependent variable is the annual number of hours worked. To allow explanatory
variables to have different effects, we divide the support of the distribution into two
segments: from 400 to 2000 hours, which corresponds to less than a fulltime job, and
over 2000 hours. Around 85% men are fulltime workers. With this approach, we
isolate part-time from full-time workers. To estimate the baseline hazard rate, the
support is divided into 50 intervals from 400 hours to 4000 hours.
Results are presented in Table 5 for 1968 and 2001. More educated men have a
larger probability of working longer in the 2 years, since estimated coefficients are
negative and significant. Individuals coming from an ethnic minority have a larger
probability of working less (positive coefficients). There do not seem to exist marked
differences linked to age. Concerning parental characteristics it is possible to see
a rather weak partial correlation with parental education, while occupation of the
Table 4 Observed and simulated schooling distributions
1968 2001
Observed Simulated Observed Simulated
Indirect eop Direct eop Indirect eop Direct eop
.20 8 11 8 12 14 12
.40 10 12 10 12 14 12
.60 12 12 11 14 15 12
.80 13 16 12 16 16 14
Std 3.52 2.05 2.24 2.49 1.17 1.31
N 1561 1561 1561 2246 2246 2246
CdFs. Observed: observed distribution of years of education. Indirect Eop: simulated distribution
equalizing circumstances. Direct Eop: Simulated distribution with equalizing effort. Std: Standard
deviation
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Table 5 Working hours distribution estimation
Hours 1968 2001
400–2000 2000–4000 400–2000 2000–4000
Age −.001 .006 .009 .009*
(.006) (.007) (.006) (.005)
Education −.031** −.028* −.049*** −.013
(.013) (.016) (.014) (.014)
Black .324*** .222** .419*** .080
(.086) (.108) (.078) (.079)
Born South −.211*** −.015 −.103 −.035
(.080) (.091) (.071) (.067)
Educ. father −.012 .018 −.015 .041***
(.016) (.017) (.015) (.015)
Educ. mother −.024* .004 −.024 −.019
(.014) (.016) (.016) (.017)
Occupation of the father (ref: Farmer)
Professional −.656 −.450 −1.438*** −2.968***
(.411) (.638) (.402) (.819)
Manager −1.129*** −.623 −1.669*** −3.102***
(.379) (.604) (.390) (.812)
Clerical −.791* −.673 −1.461*** −3.120***
(.410) (.642) (.401) (.818)
Craftsman −1.011*** −.333 −1.328*** −3.022***
(.349) (.582) (.366) (.803)
Operative −.883** −.235 −1.431*** −2.938***
(.344) (.587) (.362) (.801)
Maximum Likelihood estimation of the conditional working time distribution. Source PSID: working
men from 30 to 50. Education: years of education. Educ Father (Educ Mother): number of years of
schooling of the father (mother). South: Born in a southern state. In brackets standard errors.
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
father is more correlated with labour supply decisions especially at the bottom of the
distribution. Sons of farmers work less than the other social groups. Compared to
their impact on educational choices, circumstances variables have a weaker impact
on labour supply decisions.
Table 6 Observed and simulated labour supply distributions
1968 2001
Observed Simulated Observed Simulated
Indirect eop Direct eop Indirect eop Direct eop
.20 1940 2012 2082 1960 2049 2049
.40 2080 2082 2152 2080 2179 2114
.60 2344 2082 2152 2304 2179 2179
.80 2750 2363 2223 2640 2374 2244
Std 673 623 105 582 563 84
N 1561 1561 1561 2246 2246 2246
CdFs. Observed: observed distribution of hours worked. Indirect Eop: simulated distribution with
equalized circumstances. Direct Eop: Simulated distribution with equalized effort. Std: Standard
deviation
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For each individual we simulate two labour supply choices. In the indirect ap-
proach we equalize circumstances, while in the direct approach we equalize effort.
Table 6 provides the results of these simulations. Equalizing effort has a much larger
impact on hours worked than equalizing circumstances since the standard deviation
is divided by six when we remove effort differences, while it is nearly unchanged
when we remove circumstances differences. Contrary to schooling decision, effort
play a larger role than circumstances in explaining labour supply choices. This larger
effect comes from the larger reduction of labour supply differences at the top than at
the bottom in the direct approach.
5.1.3 Earnings distribution
Table 7 displays estimated coefficients for the conditional earnings distributions
in 1968 and 2001. The support has been divided into 50 segments until the 99th
Table 7 Conditional earnings distribution estimation
% support 1968 2001
0–50 50–100 0–50 50–100
Age −.233*** −.318*** −.129* −.202**
(.086) (.115) (.075) (.090)
Age2 .003** .004*** .001 .002*
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Education −.160*** −.161*** −.151*** −.099***
(.013) (.019) (.013) (.016)
Hours −.197*** −.190*** −.197*** −.085***
(.024) (.050) (.020) (.030)
Hours2 .003*** .003*** .003*** .001*
(.000) (.001) (.000) (.001)
Black .535*** .433*** .168** .080
(.080) (.157) (.071) (.092)
Born South .651*** .196* .284*** .138*
(.074) (.116) (.065) (.077)
Educ. Father −.052*** −.002 −.027** −.022
(.016) (.019) (.014) (.016)
Educ. Mother −.014 .001 −.041*** −.045**
(.015) (.018) (.015) (.019)
Occupation of the father (ref: Farmer)
Manager .085 −.559** −.507*** −.339**
(.210) (.219) (.133) (.153)
Professional −.738*** −.465*** −.808*** −.401***
(.203) (.153) (.140) (.145)
Clerical −.431* −.608*** −.322** −.145
(.250) (.233) (.145) (.167)
Craftsman −.507*** −.154 −.399*** .008
(.114) (.122) (.090) (.127)
Operative −.358*** .064 −.235*** .312**
(.117) (.147) (.089) (.138)
Maximum Likelihood earnings distribution estimation. In brackets standard errors.
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
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percentile. It is segmented a second time into two intervals for the estimation of the
parameters. Table 7 shows that more educated and older men have higher earnings
(coefficients are significant and negative). As expected individuals working more
have higher annual earnings, while those coming from the black minority have lower
earnings but the effect is larger in 1968 than in 2001. Inequality of opportunity
transmitted by ethnic origin seems weaker in 2001 than in 1968; these results reflect
somewhat Neal [31] who finds that earnings inequalities have decreased while
schooling inequalities are constant over the period. Having an educated father is
correlated with higher earnings, but the effect is much more important at the bottom
of the distribution than at the top. Finally, sons of farmers receive lower earnings.
After estimating the earnings distribution, we simulate on the one hand individual
earnings at fixed circumstances and on the other individual earnings at fixed effort.
From these simulated conditional distributions we build the unconditional earnings
counterfactual distributions. The next section uses these counterfactual distributions
to document the change in inequality of opportunity.
5.2 Changes in inequality of opportunity
To assess the decrease in inequality resulting from our two approaches we use scalar
inequality indexes. While the analysis looses generality when using specific inequality
indexes, it is still very common in the income distribution literature.11 We pay special
attention to indexes of the entropy class, since they are decomposable.
Figure 2 displays Theil indexes on each wave of the PSID from 1968 to 2001 for the
5 years average specification. Three curves appear in this figure. The first represents
total inequality computed on the observed earnings distribution. It indicates the
changes in outcome inequality. The two other represent inequality of opportunity
with the direct and the indirect approaches. Inequality of opportunity with the direct
approach is measure directly from the counterfactual distributions, while inequality
of opportunity with the indirect approach is measured differencing total inequality
and effort inequality provided by the counterfactual distributions. According to the
philosophers on responsibility at least this part of inequality must be corrected.
5.2.1 On average between 20 and 43% of inequality is inherited
Strikingly, the two approaches provide very similar patterns of inequality of oppor-
tunity levels from 1968 to 2001. The Theil indexes with the indirect approach in Fig. 2
are slightly higher and a little bit more changing in the mid-eighties, but on average
these two measures provide the same inequality of opportunity level all along the
period. Inequality transmitted by these observable social background characteristics
ranges from 0.035 to 0.061 with the direct approach, and from 0.02 to 0.094 with
the indirect approach, with an average value over the period at 0.048 and 0.056. It
represents the hardcore inequality. Comparing the level of inequality of opportunity
11Dinardo et al. [15] use indexes to assess the changes in their distribution after a semi-parametric
estimation. Similar procedures are implemented by Bourguignon et al. [7, 8] and Mata and
Machado [29].
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Fig. 2 Inequality of opportunity and inequality of outcome. Source: PSID, working men from 30
to 50. Total: earnings inequality. Direct Eop: Inequality of opportunity erasing effort differences.
Indirect Eop: Inequality of Opportunity erasing circumstances differences
with the level of inequality of outcome, we can compute the share of inequality that
is inherited.
Table 8 displays the minimum, maximum and mean annual share of inequality of
opportunity in inequality of outcome from 1968 to 2001. Using other decomposable
inequality indexes of the entropy class (the mean logarithmic deviation, and the half
squared coefficient of variation) we find a mean share varying between 20% to 28%
with the direct approach and between 31% and 41% in the indirect approach. Using
alternative inequality indexes, the Gini index and the standard deviation of logs, we
still find the same range of estimates varying from 26% to 43%. These results seem to
be weakly sensitive to the index chosen. Finally, we observe that averaging earnings
increases slightly the share of inequality of opportunity in inequality of outcome.
These results should be considered keeping in mind that we do not observe every
earnings determinants. It is possible that unobserved circumstances characteristics
would change the results. The problem is that the potential sign of the bias is unclear
(See Bourguignon et al. [8] for a discussion on that point). However our appraisal
of inequality of opportunity does include the effect of observed circumstances and
unobserved circumstances correlated with them.
5.2.2 Evolution: a sharp drop of inequality of opportunity
While the mean share of inequality of opportunity seems robust, however looking
only at the mean does not inform on its change over time. Figure 2 shows that while
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Table 8 Share of inequality of opportunity in inequality of outcome
Direct approach Indirect approach
Theil Mld GE(2) Sdl Gini Theil Mld GE(2) Sdl Gini
Annual earnings
Mean .236 .233 .172 .353 .322 .276 .294 .343 .279 .247
Minimum .150 .164 .075 .239 .244 .073 .100 .169 .183 .146
Maximum .337 .342 .256 .472 .419 .418 .482 .445 .356 .338
Three years average earnings
Mean .260 .271 .192 .413 .346 .305 .328 .400 .317 .258
Minimum .172 .190 .099 .319 .267 .079 .113 .206 .205 .150
Maximum .371 .388 .287 .524 .444 .438 .565 .530 .408 .350
Five years average earnings
Mean .270 .284 .201 .430 .355 .316 .343 .418 .327 .263
Minimum .186 .208 .115 .349 .281 .081 .120 .219 .220 .153
Maximum .375 .394 .292 .530 .447 .446 .554 .538 .411 .359
Mean, minimum and maximum annual share of inequality of opportunity in inequality of outcome
from 1968 to 2001. Mld: Mean logarithmic deviation, GE(2): Half squared coefficient of variation.
Sdl: Standard deviation of logs
total inequality has increased steadily inequality of opportunity has remained around
.05 Theil points all along the period. With the direct approach, the share of inequality
of opportunity has nearly been divided by two dropping from 33% in 1968 to 18.6 in
2001. The correlation between the share of inequality of opportunity and the level
of inequality of outcome turns out to be negative at −.06. Henceforth, the increase
in total earnings inequality is mainly due to the increase in inequality generated
by other earnings determinants called effort. This different evolution strengthens
that inequality of opportunity and inequality of outcome are clearly two different
concepts providing different pictures of the American society.
These results can be compared with Bourguignon et al. [8] on Brazilian data
during the nineties. These authors assess inequality of opportunity at around 25% of
total earnings inequality. While one might have expected large differences between
Brazil and the U.S. these results are very similar to ours. International comparisons
between countries of such different development levels are difficult, and the parallel
must be read with great caution. Strikingly, these results do not comfort the intuition
that inequality of opportunity would be much lower in the U.S than in Brazil.
Assessing the reasons of such a small difference is not the topic of this paper.
It pleads, though, for international comparisons of inequality of opportunity as in
Lefranc et al. [26].
6 Conclusion
In 2001 the U.S. land of opportunities keeps displaying large earnings inequalities
correlated with individual social background. This paper concludes that in the period
between 1968 and 2001 between 20% and 43% of earnings inequality is inherited.
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This share has decreased over the last few years. A more complete modeling of
disposable income acquisition would be necessary to measure the extent of inequality
of opportunity in living standards. Though our study represents only a first step
in that direction, it presents a decomposition of the different channels producing
earnings inequalities throughout the life cycle. Although simple, the decomposition
suggests that inherited inequalities have above all a major impact on human capital
accumulation decisions. They have a weaker impact on labour supply choices.
The relative drop of inequality of opportunity in inequality in outcome is the major
conclusion of our analysis. Three interpretations of the result are possible. Firstly, the
American population may exert nowadays more heterogeneous effort levels than in
the past. Alternatively, for a given circumstances group it is possible to observe more
earnings variation, since effort differences are defined by within group inequality.
Since Juhn et al. [23] these kinds of phenomena have been much discussed in the
literature, it is nowadays commonly admitted that within-group inequality represents
a large share of earnings inequality growth, see Lemieux [27] or Autor et al. [5] for
recent assessments.
Secondly, the return to effort may have increased. This explanation is directly
linked with analyses [9] demonstrating that return to education is higher today than
20 years ago, and that its growth rate has been larger for more educated workers.12
Both interpretations are possible. There is no reason to think that one is better than
the other, both return to effort and within-group heterogeneity could have increased
simultaneously. It would be interesting in future work to try to disentangle the
two phenomena.13
Thirdly, some unobservable circumstance characteristics may be more relevant
nowadays than before. It may be possible that the increase in inequality of effort is
in reality due to these factors that have been ranked as effort due to the difficulty
to observe them. In that case, the issue is to find out what these factors might
be and how to measure them. In any case they must be uncorrelated with the
included circumstances characteristics. Admittedly, our measure of circumstances is
imperfect but due to data limitation it is difficult to go further. From a theoretical
point of view see O’Neil et al. [32] for an analysis of the potential consequences
of imperfect measurement in intergenerational transition matrix. Without any more
details on the potential unobserved circumstances it is difficult to conclude on
that point.
Finally, the analysis implemented in this paper demonstrates that the evolution
of earnings inequality in the U.S. over 30 years changes according to different con-
ceptions of social justice. From a public policy perspective, it stresses the importance
of the definition of inequality. Whether policymakers aim at preserving equality of
opportunity or correcting total inequality, the definition of inequality matters.
12More precisely, for young and old college graduates, and for young high school graduates.
13It represents a limit of our nonlinear modeling. Since it precludes considering estimated coefficients
as return of explanatory variables and then using a Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition.
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Appendix
A.1 Earnings inequality measures
Table 9 Earnings inequality measures 1968–2001
Year Obs. Earnings inequality
Gini Mld P50/P10 P90/P50 Sdl Theil
1968 1,561 0.31 0.17 2.15 1.87 0.59 0.17
1969 1,415 0.30 0.16 2.16 1.87 0.58 0.16
1970 1,396 0.30 0.16 2.14 1.83 0.57 0.16
1971 1,387 0.29 0.15 2.07 1.83 0.56 0.15
1972 1,404 0.29 0.15 2.11 1.83 0.56 0.15
1973 1,397 0.30 0.16 2.17 1.81 0.57 0.16
1974 1,405 0.30 0.15 2.15 1.82 0.55 0.16
1975 1,382 0.29 0.15 2.06 1.80 0.55 0.15
1976 1,390 0.30 0.15 2.16 1.80 0.56 0.16
1977 1,478 0.30 0.15 2.06 1.86 0.55 0.16
1978 1,551 0.29 0.15 2.07 1.78 0.54 0.15
1979 1,655 0.28 0.14 2.11 1.75 0.57 0.14
1980 1,676 0.28 0.14 2.14 1.73 0.54 0.14
1981 1,690 0.28 0.14 2.13 1.74 0.56 0.14
1982 1,745 0.29 0.16 2.23 1.76 0.59 0.15
1983 1,780 0.30 0.17 2.33 1.83 0.60 0.16
1984 1,923 0.31 0.18 2.28 1.83 0.62 0.17
1985 2,058 0.32 0.19 2.35 1.89 0.63 0.18
1986 2,147 0.32 0.19 2.34 1.91 0.63 0.18
1987 2,244 0.33 0.19 2.32 1.90 0.64 0.19
1988 2,327 0.33 0.19 2.28 1.91 0.64 0.20
1989 2,420 0.33 0.19 2.32 1.92 0.63 0.19
1990 3,074 0.33 0.20 2.28 1.97 0.64 0.20
1991 3,123 0.33 0.20 2.30 1.97 0.64 0.21
1992 3,276 0.34 0.20 2.33 1.97 0.64 0.21
1993 3,257 0.34 0.21 2.32 1.99 0.65 0.22
1994 2,899 0.34 0.21 2.17 2.02 0.67 0.22
1995 2,897 0.35 0.22 2.22 2.05 0.66 0.23
1996 2,893 0.35 0.23 2.23 2.08 0.69 0.25
1997 2,177 0.35 0.22 2.06 2.12 0.66 0.25
1999 2,154 0.35 0.22 2.08 2.17 0.66 0.23
2001 2,246 0.35 0.22 2.05 2.18 0.68 0.25
65,427
Source: PSID, working 30 to 50 men. Five years average earnings. Mld: Mean logarithmic deviation,
Sdl: Standard deviation of logs
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